Introduction
There is something of a divide between the theory and practice on the role of exchange rate intervention in the central bank's toolkit. Workhorse open economy macro models used at central banks tend to downplay the role of the exchange rate. The maxim is that central banks should pay attention to exchange rates only to the extent that they bear on in ‡ation and output developments. This stance accords with the long-standing view that sterilised foreign exchange (FX) intervention, i.e. o¢ cial purchases or sales of foreign currency that leave the money supply una¤ected, has little e¤ect on the exchange rate (see, for instance, the survey in Sarno and Taylor (2001) ).
However, the doctrine of "benign neglect" of the exchange rate has been honoured more in its breach than in its observance (see Frankel (2017) ). Many central banks around the world have engaged in FX intervention, especially those in emerging market economies (EMEs) who have experienced rapid domestic credit growth that has accompanied surges in capital in ‡ows (Ghosh et al (2018) ). While individual country studies report mixed results on the e¤ectiveness of sterilised FX intervention, cross-country studies generally …nd some e¤ectiveness in curbing …nancial conditions and exchange rate dynamics (Ghosh et al (2018) , Villamizar-Villegas and Perez-Reyna (2017), Fratzscher et al (2018) ). Recent empirical …ndings have shed some light on how FX intervention shapes the impact of capital ‡ows on domestic …nancial conditions. Blanchard et al. (2015) show that capital ‡ow shocks have signi…cantly smaller repercussions on exchange rates and capital accounts in countries that regularly intervene in FX markets.
Our paper aims to deepen our understanding of how FX intervention a¤ects credit growth, and to shed light on the possible mechanisms at play. Conceptually, an important element of our analysis is the role of …nancial intermediaries in a setting where risk constraints interact with market outcomes, thereby tying together prices and balance sheet quantities. Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) popularised an approach to exchange rate determination in this vein with risk-constrained intermediaries, and we build on their insights here. Additionally, recent contributions have shed light on the role of the exchange rate in credit developments. Diamond, Hu and Rajan (2018) build on corporate …nance models on how collateral values and liquidity interact in in ‡uencing leverage, and show how currency appreciation elicits similar e¤ects in an open economy setting. They argue that FX intervention has attributes of a prudential tool that leans against credit booms. Bruno and Shin (2015) focus on the lending capacity of banks that are subject to risk constraints. Currency appreciation reduces tail risks when banks have diversi…ed loan portfolios, thereby increasing loan supply. FX intervention can lean against this process.
We employ a rarely available high-frequency central bank database of FX operations by the Bank of the Republic (BoR), Colombia, and combine it with detailed bank-bybank daily ‡ow data on new loans to corporates covering the entire Colombian banking system. Our sample covers the period 2002 to 2015. The high frequency nature of the data coupled with the panel structure of the entire credit registry facilitates a rigorous study of the e¤ects of FX intervention on domestic credit. To our knowledge, our paper is the …rst to draw on such a database for the analysis of the …nancial stability implications of sterilised FX intervention.
We hone intuition through a model with a banking sector where the exchange rate a¤ects the supply of local currency domestic credit to corporate borrowers. The key prediction of the model is that the purchase of dollars by the central bank …nanced by the sale of domestic bonds dampens bank credit supply in domestic currency. The channel is through the interaction of balance sheet e¤ects on corporates and the banking sector.
When borrowing …rms have dollar debts, an appreciation of the currency reduces tail risk for a bank with a diversi…ed loan portfolio. When lending follows a Value-at-Risk (VaR) rule, currency appreciation results in increased loan supply.
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Sterilised FX intervention then has two mutually reinforcing e¤ects. The …rst is to lean against the increase in bank lending capacity due to the e¤ects of currency appreciation operating through the risk-taking channel of the exchange rate. The second e¤ect is the "crowding out"of bank lending capacity by increasing the supply of domestic bonds to be absorbed by banks. The overall quantitative impact of the central bank's FX intervention results from the combination of these two e¤ects.
The core of our paper is the empirical investigation, where we test the key predictions of the model. We report four key …ndings, obtained based on high-frequency panel local linear projection (LLP) regressions in the spirit of Jordà (2005) .
First, we …nd that sterilised FX purchases have a signi…cant and persistent dampening e¤ect on new domestic bank lending. This is the core result of our analysis.
Second, sterilised FX purchases depreciate the domestic currency and reduce capi-tal in ‡ows in a signi…cant and persistent manner. This result supports the idea that intervention is transmitted through an exchange rate risk-taking channel.
Third, central bank open market operations (OMOs), even those unrelated to FX intervention, also reduce domestic lending. This …nding is consistent with a "crowding out" channel being at work. However, the estimated e¤ect is much smaller than that of the sterilised FX intervention operation, highlighting the importance of the exchange rate channel in the transmission of intervention. Moreover, closer inspection reveals that only OMOs in bonds have a signi…cant impact on lending, not short-term repos.
Fourth, we …nd that, in the cross-section of banks, the credit-dampening e¤ects of sterilised FX purchases are stronger for banks whose balance sheet constraints bind harder, e.g. due to low capitalisation or high leverage. Weaker banks therefore appear to be more sensitive to the tightening e¤ect on …nancial conditions of the intervention, a result that echoes the …ndings established in the literature on the bank lending channel of monetary transmission.
Taken together, our results lend support to the proposition that sterilised intervention can lean against credit growth during periods of sustained capital in ‡ows accompanied by currency appreciation.
The "crowding out" channel of FX intervention has been much discussed in policy circles. When the balance sheet capacity of banks is limited due to capital or leverage constraints, an increase in the supply of bonds to banks through the sterilisation leg of an FX intervention reduces their capacity to extend loans. Céspedes et al. (2017) and Chang (2018) have developed models in this spirit, although the economic impact of crowding out will depend on how far banks can o¤set the balance sheet constraints. 2 Ghosh et al (2018) an increase in FX reserves is associated with signi…cantly lower bank loan growth, which they interpret as re ‡ecting a crowding out of loans through reserve accumulation.
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In contrast, our paper places at the centre of the analysis the exchange rate itself.
FX intervention moderates the appreciation of the domestic currency and thereby leans against the relaxation of the Value-at-Risk constraint and hence the expansion of the lending capacity of the banking sector.
Our paper adds to the literature on …nancial frictions and capital ‡ows (see, for instance, Cavallino (2018) , Amador et al ((2017) , and Fanelli and Straub (2017) ) and engages with the debate on the co-movement of …nancial conditions across markets and the associated policy challenges. Rey (2013) argued that economies may not face a trilemma (incompatibility of …xed exchange rate, open capital account and independent monetary policy), but instead may face a dilemma between free capital ‡ows and independent monetary policy. This discussion bears on the design of monetary policy frameworks in emerging market economies (Ghosh et al (2018) , Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2019) The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model and derives its main predictions for the impact of sterilised FX intervention on domestic lending. Section 3 describes the data and the Colombian institutional background. Section 4 presents evidence on the dynamic impact of FX intervention and the channels through which it operates. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Model
The model builds on the banking model of Bruno and Shin (2015) to incorporate the portfolio allocation problem between loans and sovereign bonds, so as to study the impact of sterilised FX intervention that has both exchange rate and bond supply e¤ects. We begin with the determination of the loan book.
Loan demand
There is a continuum of risk-neutral borrowers ("entrepreneurs") with access to a project that needs one unit of …xed capital and one unit of labour input. Entrepreneurs borrow 1 unit of the domestic currency ("peso") from banks to …nance the initial …xed investment.
Loans are granted at date 0, and the project realisation and repayment is due at date 1. The loan interest rate is r, so that borrowers need to repay 1 + r. The disutility of the entrepreneur's labour input is distributed in the population according to cumulative distribution function H (:) with support on [0; 1).
We assume that borrowers have a legacy debt of 1 dollar, and experience valuation e¤ects of exchange rate movements. Denote by the dollar value of the peso at date 0, so that a higher indicates a stronger peso. If the borrower takes on the project, the notional value of debt in pesos is thus 1 + 1= .
The realisation of the borrower's project follows the Merton (1974) model of credit risk, and is assumed to be the random variable V 1 , de…ned as:
where W j is a standard normal and s is a constant. Borrowers are risk-neutral and have limited liability. Hence, borrower j with e¤ort cost e j undertakes the project if:
Denote by e (r) the threshold cost level where (2) holds with equality when the loan rate is r. Loan demand is the mass of entrepreneurs with e¤ort cost below e (r). Denoting by C d (r) the loan demand at loan interest rate r, we have:
Since H ( ) has full support on [0; 1), C d (r) > 0 for all r > 0 and is strictly decreasing in r.
Banks
There is a continuum of competitive banks. Each bank has two units -a loan unit which lends in pesos to corporate borrowers, and a bond unit which holds risk-free peso sovereign bonds. The bank allocates equity capital to the two units so as to maximise total bank pro…t subject to constraints on the portfolio choice of the two units, as described below.
For the loan book, the bank lends to many borrowers and can diversify away idiosyncratic risk. Credit risk follows the Vasicek (2002) model, a many borrower generalisation of Merton (1974) . The standard normal W j in (1) is given by the linear combination:
where Y and X j are mutually independent standard normals. Y is the common risk factor while each X j is the idiosyncratic risk facing borrower j. The parameter 2 (0; 1) determines the weight given to the common factor Y .
The borrower defaults when V 1 < 1 + r + 1= , which can be written as:
where d j is distance to default:
Denote by F (z) the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the realised value of one peso face value of loans when the exchange rate is given by . We have the following key feature of our model.
In other words, the c.d.f. of the bank's loan portfolio is lower when the peso is stronger. In this sense, the tail risk of the bank's loan portfolio from default declines as the peso appreciates in the sense of …rst-degree stochastic dominance. The proof of Lemma 1 follows Bruno and Shin (2015) and is given in the appendix.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is that the bank can diversify away idiosyncratic default risk for individual borrowers, but cannot fully diversify away the tail risk due to the common component Y in the project outcomes. However, peso appreciation reduces individual borrower default, and has the e¤ect of reducing tail risk. For a bank that is subject to a Value-at-Risk constraint, the smaller tail risk translates to higher lending.
Bank portfolio choice
Each bank has two units -a loan unit and a bond unit. The total capital of the bank i (its book equity) in pesos is denoted by E i . The bond unit is allocated capital of E B i , while the loan unit is allocated capital of E C i , where "C"stands for "credit". The capital allocation satis…es:
The loan unit is subject to the Value-at-Risk (VaR) rule whereby the probability that loan losses exceed the capital of the unit is no higher than constant probability > 0. Denote by f the funding rate of the loan unit and by L i the total non-equity funding amount of the loan unit. We assume for simplicity that f is constant. 4 The
VaR constraint is that the realised value of the loan portfolio is su¢ cient to cover the repayment owed by the loan unit with probability at least 1 . Formally, the VaR constraint is given by:
where F (:) is the c.d.f. of the loan portfolio value. We then have the following feature of our model.
where is an increasing function of , and is identical across all i.
In other words, the leverage of the loan unit increases when the peso appreciates. For any given level of capital E C i , an appreciation of the peso translates into an increase in total lending C i . The proof of Lemma 2 is in the appendix.
The intuition for this result follows from the link between tail risk and the exchange rate described in Lemma 1. First, risk-neutrality implies that (8) binds, and holds as an equality. When the peso appreciates, the tail risk of the loan portfolio shrinks. For the loan unit which is subject only to the VaR constraint, peso appreciation relaxes the constraint and allows it to expand lending.
We now turn to the bank's bond unit. Denote by B i the peso bond holding of bank i.
Further, denote by q the bond interest rate and g the (constant) funding cost of the bond unit. We assume that the bond holding of the bank is determined as a constant leverage multiple of the capital allocated to the bond unit of the bank. From the adding up constraint (7), the capital of the bond unit is given by
, so that the bond holding is:
The aggregate supply of peso lending is obtained by summing C i across all banks i.
Denoting by C the aggregate peso loan supply, we have:
where E C is the sum of E C i across the banking sector, and where we have indicated that leverage is a function of the peso exchange rate.
Aggregate bond holding by all banks i is denoted as B, and is obtained by summing (9) across all banks:
From (10) and (11), the supply of credit for loans and bond holdings satis…es constant returns to scale. Therefore, it is without loss of generality to suppose that there is a single price-taking bank with capital E that is allocated across the two activities.
Let B denote the stock of outstanding peso bonds, and assume that the total stock is held by the banking sector, as is often the case in practice for central bank sterilisation bonds. The market clearing condition is that B = B.
Impact of currency appreciation
One key result of our model is that peso appreciation increases the supply of peso lending by banks.
Proposition 3 Bank lending to domestic borrowers in pesos expands when the peso appreciates against the dollar.
Proof. From (25), we have:
Since leverage ( ) is an increasing function of , equation (12) implies that a peso appreciation increases the overall bank lending to local borrowers.
Sterilised FX intervention that weakens the peso dampens domestic credit by lowering ( ) : Equation (12) further implies that when the outstanding amount of peso bonds B increases, there is a "crowding out" e¤ect on domestic loans. Other things equal, an increase in B is associated with a decline in lending to domestic corporates. The increased supply of bonds entails a greater amount of bank capital devoted to the bond portfolio, with less bank capital devoted to the loan portfolio. Thus, the sterilisation leg of the FX intervention has an additional and independent negative e¤ect on domestic credit.
Another feature of our model is on the complementarity of peso depreciation and increased bond supply in dampening domestic lending. From (12), when the peso depreciates against the dollar, the leverage of the loan unit decreases. Hence, when the increase in B is accompanied by a peso depreciation, the crowding out e¤ect on domestic lending is magni…ed by the exchange rate change.
Formally, from (12), we have:
Hence the cross derivative is:
We summarise our …ndings as follows.
Proposition 4 An increase in the stock of peso bonds reduces lending. This reduction is larger if the increased stock of peso bonds is accompanied by a depreciation of the peso against the dollar.
Data and institutional background
In the empirical analysis, we make use of high-frequency data for Colombia, available but with a rather large standard deviation (second column). The median loan amount was considerably lower, at 3.5 billion pesos. The average interest rate of the new loans was 13.6% with less variation compared to the loan amount (third column). The median interest rate amounted to 11.93%. The maturity of the new loans was rather short, with an average of just more than two years (fourth column). 
Credit registry

FX intervention
Data for sterilised FX intervention are from the BoR's Market Operations and Development Department (Departamento de Operaciones y Desarrollo de Mercados -Mesa de Dinero). Speci…cally, we use data on daily intervention ‡ows, which are not a¤ected by valuation changes of FX reserves due to exchange rate changes. The BoR, as an in ‡ation targeter, never targeted a speci…c level of the exchange rate, but instead aimed to reduce exchange rate volatility or to accumulate international reserves. Figure 2 shows that BoR conducted various types of FX intervention, Table 2 presents descriptive statistics.
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We distinguish four di¤erent intervention methods:
Pre-announced FX interventions: Constant and pre-announced sterilised purchases of foreign currency intended to accumulate international reserves. Through these operations, the central bank purchased a total of $23.9 billion dollars over the sample period.
Discretionary spot market interventions: Sterilised FX interventions conducted in the centralised Colombian FX market (ICAP-SETFX ) in order to avoid excessive exchange rate movements. Over time, the BoR purchased a total of $11.7 billion dollars with these interventions.
Rule-based options interventions: Operations conducted to stem exchange rate volatility, through which the central bank purchased (sold) a total of $2.4 ($2.3) billion dollars.
Discretionary options interventions: Operations conducted to accumulate international reserves in order to reduce external vulnerabilities. Over the period considered, the BoR purchased (sold) a total of $3.4 ($0.6) billion dollars.
In total, the BoR purchased $41 billion dollars in FX reserves, and sold $3 billion dollars.
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Pre-announced daily purchases through FX auctions amounted to more than half of all interventions over the sample period. Due to their pre-announced nature, these interventions were anticipated by markets, which greatly complicates identifying their impact.
Given that this type of intervention was concentrated in the period after 2010 (Figure   2 ), we focus in our empirical exercises on the period of 2002-2010. Over this period, interventions were discretionary, which should better enable identifying their e¤ects on domestic credit, exchange rates and capital ‡ows. We however assess robustness of our results to the use of the full sample of data. Table 2 . FX intervention statistics (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . Authors'calculations. Units are in million dollars.
Sterilisation
In the sterilisation leg of the FX intervention, the central bank conducts open market operations (OMOs) in order to sterilise the e¤ects of the intervention on domestic liquidity supply. OMOs adjust the day-to-day money supply in order to meet demand, so that the short-term money market rates are kept close to the policy rate (Borio and
Disyatat (2010)). More speci…cally, the BoR targets the interbank overnight rate, which corresponds to the weighted average rate for all overnight non-collateralised transactions.
The mechanics of the BoR's OMOs work as follows: At the close of a business day, the BoR announces a liquidity quota for the following day at rate i , corresponding to the policy rate set by the board of directors. A contractionary (expansionary) auction would take place the following day, if the market had excess (shortage of) liquidity. Ideally, the amount auctioned by the central bank had to match the amount required for the overnight interbank rate to converge to i*. Thus, the liquidity quota considers changes in the money demand and supply. On the demand side, the sta¤ of the central bank conducts bimonthly forecasts (of the money demand) based on the banking system's reserve requirements as well as seasonal factors (holidays, pay days, etc.). On the supply side, the central bank monitors the issuance of public debt, changes in the monetary base brought forth by FX interventions, and other supply-driven changes such as expiring liquidity operations and government transfers (see Cardozo et al. 2016) . Speci…cally, the central bank sets its OMOs based on the following equation:
where F XI t denotes net purchases of foreign currency (expressed in domestic currency),
Gov t is the issuance of public debt, and 4M t (i ) is the additional change in liquidity so that in equilibrium , the inter-bank rate coincides with the policy rate (i ). were not used as an active tool to manage liquidity in money markets by the BoR. Table 3 . OMO statistics (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . Authors'calculations. Units are in trillion pesos.
Control variables
In the empirical analysis that follows, we further make use of a large set of bank-level and macro-…nancial controls. From the credit registry, we obtain data on individual banks'total assets, capitalisation, liabilities, loan loss provisions as well as the internal loan risk grading as a measure of the riskiness of the loan book. The macro-…nancial controls include net portfolio capital ‡ows, net bond issuance of the government, the bilateral Colombian peso/US dollar exchange rate, the VIX index, the BoR policy rate, 
High-frequency panel evidence
In the empirical analysis, we …rst explore the dynamic e¤ects of sterilised FX intervention on new corporate loans in Colombia. In the next step, we assess the relevance of the two main channels through which sterilised FX intervention may a¤ect domestic credit.
We test the exchange rate channel by estimating the dynamic e¤ects of sterilised FX interventions on the exchange rate and on capital ‡ows. We also test the relevance of the "crowding out" channel by exploring the impact of central bank OMOs (including those unrelated to FX intervention) on domestic lending. In the last empirical exercise, we assess the transmission of sterilised FX intervention based on the cross-sectional variation of our bank data set using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach. Speci…cally, we test whether sterilised FX intervention has a larger e¤ect on banks that are …nancially more constrained, which would be indicative of FX intervention working through the described …nancial channels.
Estimation approach
The empirical methodology used for the analysis are panel local linear projection (LLP) regressions in the spirit of Jordà (2005) . The LLP method has become a standard tool in empirical analyses to derive dynamic impulse responses. Compared to vector autoregressions (VARs), it is more robust to misspeci…cation because it does not impose implicit dynamic restrictions on the shape of the impulse responses. Moreover, the LLP approach can more easily accommodate non-linearities of the type we are exploring in Section 4.4.
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We run LLP regressions over horizons up to 200 working days, regressing the cumulative ‡ow of new corporate loans by bank i on the BoR's sterilised FX intervention F XI.
We denote by y i;t the face value of new corporate loans granted by bank i in period t and by Y i;t+h the cumulative ‡ow of new corporate loans by bank i over the period t to t + h (respectively normalised by the stock of corporate loans of bank i in period t 1). The panel LLP model takes the form:
for h = 1; ::; 200. The matrix Z i includes bank speci…c controls while the matrix F comprises the macro-…nancial controls. For bank-level controls, we include a bank's total assets, its capitalisation, liabilities, loan loss provisions as well as its internal loan risk grading. The purpose of including these variables is to control for di¤erences in lending behaviour of the individual bank due to its size, capitalisation, liabilities as well as the riskiness of its loan book as captured by provisions and the internal loan grading.
9 See e.g. Bernardini and Peersman (2018) for a discussion of the pros and cons of the LLP approach compared to the VAR approach.
The macro-…nancial control variables include net portfolio in ‡ows, the change in the policy rate, the change in the long-term government bond yield, the deviation of in ‡ation from the Bank of the Republic's target level, the Colombian government's net bond issuance, the log level of the VIX index and the change in the bilateral exchange rate of the Colombian peso against the US dollar. Moreover, we include a dummy variable for the period from May 7, 2007 to October 8, 2008 when the central bank introduced controls on capital in ‡ows requiring foreign investors to deposit 40% of portfolio and debt investments at the BoR during a six-month period without interest payments (i.e. an unremunerated reserve requirements).
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The regressions also include a lagged dependent variable y i;t 1 in order to capture persistence in the dynamics of the dependent variable. Since the time-series dimension is large, with on average about 1,000 observations for each individual bank, the Nickell bias is not a problem for our analysis and we can proceed with estimating the panel model by OLS rather than a GMM estimator.
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Since the control variables included in Z i and F also include those variables that describe the BoR's FX intervention reaction function, equation (15) 10 Other regulatory controls (Posición Propia -PP, Posición Propia de contado -PPC) required commercial banks to have a positive but limited exposure of foreign currency, de…ned as net assets denominated in foreign currency relative to total capital. However, this policy was never binding for PP and almost never binding for PPC.
11 The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in …xed-e¤ects panel estimations can give rise to biases in panels with small time dimensions (Nickell (1981) ). However, when the time dimension of the panel is su¢ ciently large, the Nickell bias should not be a concern. 
Empirical results
Testing for the transmission channels
In order to shed light on the channels underlying the negative impact of sterilised FX purchases on domestic credit, we perform a number of additional empirical exercises. We …rst examine the impact of FX purchases on the persistence of the impact on exchange rate through a set of LLP regressions for the change in the value of the Colombian peso against the US dollar. We also run a similar exercise to examine the impact on portfolio in ‡ows. Speci…cally, we run LLP regressions of the form:
where x t is respectively the log change in the Colombian peso's US dollar exchange rate or the level of net portfolio in ‡ows (in US dollars) and X t+h is the cumulative sum of x t over the period t to t + h. The regressions are run in daily frequency for horizons up to 200 days. The set of control variables F includes the change in the policy rate, the change in the long-term government bond yield, the Colombian government's net bond issuance and the log level of the VIX index.
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 5 . Regarding the impact on the exchange rate, a 30 million dollar sterilised FX intervention is followed by a depreciation of the peso exchange rate against the dollar and the impulse response is statistically highly signi…cant (based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors). Interestingly, the e¤ect of the intervention, while being already significant on impact, further builds up over time. The immediate impact is a depreciation of roughly 0.4%, but the peak impact is a depreciation of more than 2% after 120 days.
Quantitatively and qualitatively, the response pattern of the exchange rate that we …nd is consistent with the recent evidence of persistent e¤ects of FX intervention in Israel reported in Caspi et al (2018) ).
The persistence in the exchange rate response probably re ‡ects the additional e¤ect from the slowdown in capital in ‡ows that follows the intervention with a lag (right-hand panel). Net capital in ‡ows signi…cantly decline in the wake of the intervention, and the response is similarly sluggish as that of the exchange rate. Speci…cally, a 30 million sterilised FX intervention slows capital in ‡ows by also about 30 million US dollars after 200
days. This observation suggests that sterilised FX intervention not only has the capacity to break the mutually reinforcing feedback loop between exchange rate appreciation and capital in ‡ows that emanates from the exchange rate risk taking channel, but that it can even make it play out in reverse through the initial depreciation impact.
In order to test the "crowding out"channel of sterilised FX intervention, we re-run the panel equation (15), but replace sterilised FX intervention with the BoR's open market operations. As explained above, the crowding out channel is one where the sterilisation leg of the FX intervention can absorb balance sheet capacity so that it is precluded from being utilised into domestic credit creation. That reasoning implies, however, that such an absorption e¤ect could also be achieved through OMOs more generally, not only those that are linked to an FX intervention. This is a testable hypothesis. The impulse responses obtained from re-running equation (15) The e¤ect of OMOs on domestic credit however seems to depend on the sterilisation instrument used. We re-run equation (15) repos. This …nding re ‡ects the di¤erent maturities of the underlying operations. While repos have mostly one-day maturities, operations in longer maturity bonds have a longer lasting e¤ect on banks'balance sheet capacity which can a¤ect their lending decisions.
Panel evidence across banks
Another way to identify the e¤ects of sterilised FX intervention on domestic …nancial conditions is through the di¤erences of the impact across banks.
The literature on the exchange rate risk-taking channel suggests that a depreciation of a country's exchange rate is associated with a tightening of …nancial conditions more generally (e.g. Hofmann et al (2017) ). At the same time, the literature on the bank lending channel of monetary transmission (Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Mishkin (1996)) has shown that a monetary tightening has a stronger impact on …nancial institutions that are …nancially more vulnerable, i.e. small banks with limited access to non-deposit funding or banks with low capitalisation or high debt (e.g. Stein (1995, 2000) , Kishan and Opiela (2000) , Gambacorta (2005)). If similar mechanisms are also at work when …nancial conditions tighten more generally, sterilised FX purchases that depreciate the currency and tighten …nancial conditions through the exchange rate risktaking channel would be expected to have a stronger e¤ect on banks which are …nancially more vulnerable.
Similarly, the theoretical analysis of Chang (2018) suggests that the e¤ectiveness of sterilised FX intervention depends on the …nancial sector being borrowing constrained.
If banks are borrowing constrained they will be less able to circumvent the e¤ects of sterilised FX intervention on their balance sheets by raising additional funds to rebalance their asset portfolio. In other words, more …nancially constrained banks would be expected to be more adversely a¤ected by a sterilised FX purchase by the central bank and to constrain new lending by more.
Taken together, these considerations imply that intervention has a stronger e¤ect on …nancially weaker banks. This provides another test of the hypothesis that sterilised FX intervention a¤ects domestic credit conditions through …nancial channels.
We adopt a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) to test how …nancial channels of intervention work through banks'balance sheets. Specifically, we augment the panel LLPs from equation (15) 
In order to focus on the interaction terms as an alternative way to test the e¤ectiveness of sterilised FX intervention, we further include in the amended speci…cation time-…xed e¤ects t so that all macro-…nancial variables that vary only in the time series dimension, including the FX intervention itself, drop out. Identi…cation of the intervention e¤ects is thus achieved exclusively through cross-sectional variation at the bank level (di¤erence-in-di¤erence).
Following the empirical literature on the bank lending channel of monetary policy (e.g.
Gambacorta (2005)), we consider the following bank characteristics to measure a bank's …nancial weakness: bank capitalisation and bank size, with better capitalised and larger banks expected to have easier and cheaper access to funding; bank total leverage (debt over assets), with more leverage expected to limit a bank's …nancial room for manoeuvre;
and loan loss provisions, with higher provisions indicating higher …nancial vulnerability of the bank through loan losses.
The results reported in Table 4 Table 4 . Interaction e¤ects between FX intervention and bank characteristics. Estimation based on local linear projections. Cross-section and period cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Capitalisation is de…ned as equity over assets. Bank size corresponds to total assets relative to average banking sector assets. Debt is de…ned as bank debt plus accounts payable over total assets. Provisions are de…ned as loan loss provisions over assets.
has a larger e¤ect on weaker banks. Bearing in mind that the baseline e¤ect of FX intervention on corporate loans is negative, the results suggest that the impact of FX intervention signi…cantly decreases in the capital ratio; it signi…cantly decreases in bank size; it signi…cantly increases in the level of bank debt relative to total assets; and it increases in the amount of loan loss provisions albeit not in a statistically signi…cant way.
Table 4 also shows that higher provisions and higher debt dampen new lending, while higher capital and greater size tend to increase it in a signi…cant way. These …ndings suggest that greater …nancial constraints, measured in di¤erent ways, not only amplify the transmission of FX intervention, but also have an independent negative e¤ect on bank lending.
In sum, the di¤erence-in-di¤erence panel evidence supports the idea that FX intervention works through …nancial conditions and banks' balance sheet capacities. This heterogenous e¤ect of intervention on the domestic …nancial sector could also contribute to medium-term …nancial stability by leaning against …nancially weaker banks unduly increasing exposures during capital in ‡ow surges and sheltering them from the fallout when the ‡ows ebb.
Conclusions
Emerging market economies have come a long way since the crises of the 1990s. The combination of ‡oating exchange rates, …nancial deepening and development, resilient banking systems and prudent macro policy frameworks leave them better prepared to meet the challenges of capital ‡ow swings. However, these developments have not removed the policy challenges from ‡uctuations in capital ‡ows. These challenges stem from the imperfect nature of exchange rates as shock absorbers that bring real macro variables back into equilibrium in the way that textbooks suggest. Speci…cally, capital in ‡ows are associated with currency appreciation that in turn attracts more capital in ‡ows as it ‡atters borrowers balance sheets and loosens lender value-at-risks constraints. The result is often a mutually reinforcing feedback loop fueling domestic …nancial imbalances.
The theoretical and empirical analysis of this paper supports the notion that sterilised FX intervention can help stem capital in ‡ows in an emerging market economy. Sterilised FX purchases signi…cantly dampen future bank lending. The e¤ects work mainly through an exchange rate channel. A sterilised FX purchase signi…cantly depreciates the exchange rate and reduces future net capital in ‡ows, reversing the mutually reinforcing feedback loop between the two variables arising from the exchange rate risk-taking channel. In addition, central bank sterilisation operations with the banking sector seem to exert an independent negative e¤ect by "crowding out"new lending.
Our …ndings suggest that FX intervention provides a leaning element that can usefully complement the cleaning elements that are provided through the global …nancial safety net (GFSN) 12 in promoting macro-…nancial stability in EMEs, and globally. In many policy discussions, the build-up of FX reserves is seen as a second best to the provision of a comprehensive and reliable GFSN. However, this conclusion may not be so clear-cut in practice. As documented in this paper, the build-up of FX reserves that leans against credit developments may actually have a prudential element that dampens the size of the 12 The GFSN is comprised of four main elements: the level of national FX reserves, bilateral currency swap agreements, regional …nancing arrangements, and the IMF instruments. For more details, see ECB (2016), IMF (2016) and Scheubel and Stracca (2016) .
boom itself. In this sense, the debate on the relative merits of "leaning versus cleaning"in the domestic monetary policy sphere has a counterpart in the international sphere, also.
As such, leaning by building up reserves may have merits that go beyond the GFSN.
The challenge with any systematic use of FX intervention is the charge of "beggar thy neighbour" currency manipulation for trade competitiveness reasons. One way to avoid this problem would be to conduct FX intervention with a view to reduce exchange rate volatility and by slowing the pace of currency appreciation and depreciation, as opposed to targeting a certain level of the exchange rate. FX interventions may be used in a targeted and symmetric way to lean against exchange rate swings during capital in ‡ow surges and ebbs, and against associated building up …nancial imbalances. In this way, they can usefully complement monetary policy and macroprudential tools contributing to a policy approach that leans against capital ‡ow volatility and its consequences.
The design and use of FX intervention as a complementary policy tool for …nancial stability purposes must of course be assessed in the broader context of FX reserve adequacy. Precautionary considerations are the main motive for reserve accumulation in EMEs, and the perceived bene…ts depend on the external exposure of the economy and on the risks of adverse external shocks. Our analysis suggests that dampening the impact of expansionary external factors on the domestic …nancial system could be another bene…t. However, accumulating FX reserves is also associated with signi…cant …scal costs
The extent of precautionary reserve accumulation and of the use of intervention as a stabilisation tool will depend on the assessment of the net bene…ts, taking into account all perceived bene…ts and costs, which will vary across countries and over time. 
Notional liabilities Notional assets
We will use the shorthand:
Clearly, ' 2 (0; 1). From (23) and the balance sheet identity E C i + L i = C i of the bank's loan unit, we can solve for the supply of loans by bank i, which is given by
We can re-write this expression as
where is the leverage of the loan unit, given by
Finally, we note from (24) that does not depend on i. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
